THE CONFUCIAN VIRTUE OF REN IN HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS

Keping Wang

INTRODUCTION

Social philosophy corresponds in a way to its moral and political counterparts. It is internally associated with social ethics as is conceived as the ontology of the social world or organization. It is especially so when it involves the inquiry into the two particular domains: social interaction and social aggregation among human individuals.

According to Philip Pettit, the forms of social interaction and aggregation are neither purely physical nor non-social. They “require the people involved to have certain intentional attitudes” instead. (Honderich, 1995:832)  Actually in social life, as the non-atomists believe, social dependence governs the ability of an individual to reason and think: the ability of this type is not just to have beliefs and desires, but to act with a view to having rational beliefs and desires. Accordingly, these beliefs and desires are there to shape “certain intentional attitudes”. Then in turn, such attitudes will bear both direct and indirect impact upon social interaction and aggregation on the one hand, and upon social practices and relationships on the other hand. Here I agree mostly with the non-atomists on this point: individual human beings depend on social relationships for the appearance of any distinctive human capacities. If this is true, it could be claimed that each human being will come properly into one’s own just in the experience of social relationships, and meanwhile, foster self-consciousness of personal cultivation in an ethical sense for the sake of adjusting social relationships to a positive and healthy extend, so to speak.

As regards the ontology of the social world, I would like to ponder over it from the Confucian position. In my opinion, the essential part of the ontology of this kind consists in the human individuals not merely as social members, but also as moral beings. The intrinsic logic therein could be thus perceived: the ontology of the social organization in one sense considers how the organizational structure, institution and administration come into existence and function in an effective manner, and in other sense, it examines what is the most determinate cause of the possible effectiveness in this domain.

What is worth noticing here is the general distinction between social relationships in a modern sense and human relationships in a Confucian sense: the former is based on social contract behind which is the legal codes enacted as laws, whilst the latter based on human affection behind which is the cultural conventions prescribed as rites. According to the Confucian tradition, “the sage is the acme of human relationships (shengren zhe, renlun zhi zhi ye),” which implies that the sage as the highest personality of perfect virtue is the most capable person to reconcile and maintain human relationships to the best possible condition. This will then serve to stabilize the social structure as a whole and harmonize social interaction as well as social aggregation altogether. This being the case in Confucianism, the distinction between human relationships and social relationships could be rather vague and obscure in theory and praxis as well. For the Confucians tend to embrace the conviction that the social world is composed of human beings, and its management therefore lies in the treatment of human relationships in essence. Moreover, as Confucianism features a trinity of political, moral and religious dimensions in principle, it often believes that the appropriate exercise and cultivation of the virtue of ren (also spelt as jen in the Giles’ system) plays an important role in reconciling human relationships, and procuring social harmony as well as social stability. This is mainly because of the fact that human individuals as social members are decisive in organizing and administrating the social world so long as they are well cultivated and rightly ruled. In other words, the organizational structure, institution and administration of the social world could be designed to work practically providing the human relationships are harmoniously formed, properly treated, and constructively retained. This off course relies chiefly on the personal cultivation and consistent exercise of the Confucian virtue of ren qua humanness, universal love, reciprocal benevolence and so forth. Such dialectic interlink shows the Confucian conviction that no matter how well the system of the organizational structure and institution of the social world is schemed and promoted, it will most likely fail to secure the predicted objectives without the availability of sound human relationships underlined by the virtue of ren that is considered to be the kernel of the superior personality or gentlemanship (jun zi) somewhat equal to the virtuous citizenship of the Platonic type.

This discussion attempts to look into the social and moral implications of the Confucian virtue of ren with particular reference to its three aspects as follows: the reciprocal benevolence to facilitate the reconciliation of human relationships, the social compassion to nurture humane sensibility among social members, and the moral ideal of human perfection to enhance its transformational creation in the context of the living condition today. It is intended not merely to rediscover the conventional meanings of the virtue from a sociological perspective, but also to reconsider its extended significance from an ethical one.

Incidentally, what I am trying to do is partly encouraged by my intentional consciousness to supply some food for thought taken from the sources of Chinese philosophy. For an alternative perspective from non-western heritage would lead us to move out of the beaten track of investigating the social issues encountered today. Even though it could be no easy matter to solicit any agreeable or fruitful solutions, it would at least help us employ a new angle for reconsideration, and deploy a fresh mind for reflection in the realm of social philosophy. Apart from this, my trial endeavor is also partly inspired by Li Zehou’s proposed discrimination between ethical and religious preoccupations through critical inheritance and transformational creation. (Li, 1998:8)  I reckon that the ethical and religious dimensions in this case could be utilized to serve for the socio-political purposes provided they could be transformed creatively into individual’s pursuit of the meaning of life in one sense, and into the Chinese form of modern political and legal system with emphasis on human relationships, group dynamics, social ideals, unity in affectionateness and reasonableness, consultative settlement of civil disputes and the like. All this is expected to dissolve into the construction of modern political and legal democracy, and thus open up a unique path of future development in China or elsewhere in this “global village”.

THE VIRTUE OF REN AS THE CAUSE OF RECIPROCAL BENEVOLENCE

Etymologically speaking, the Confucian virtue of ren is originated from the primordial form of the Chinese word in its picture-writing style. Its form consists in “human” (ren) on the left side, and “two” (er) on the right side. It is therefore thought of as a kind of humane and reciprocal act that engages at least two human individuals. For such virtue could occur nowhere if there were only a single human individual with no social interaction with any other. This being the case, the conception of ren is often rendered as humaneness and reciprocal benevolence due to its characteristic involvement of human relationships or social interaction.

Correspondingly, the afore-mentioned meaning is granted and furthered by Confucius (551-479 BC) and his subsequent adherents. In The Doctrine of the Mean (Zhong yong) as one of the Confucian classics, when the Lord of Lu State asked about government, Confucius replied:

The government of the ancient Emperors Wen and Wu is displayed in the historical records presented in the tablets of wood and bamboos. Let there be the men and the government will flourish; but without the men, their government decays and ceases. With the right men the growth of government is rapid, just as that of vegetarian is rapid in earth…Therefore the administration of government lies in getting proper men. Such men are to be got by means of the ruler’s own character. That character is to be cultivated by means the Dao of morality. And the Dao of morality is cultivated by the virtue of benevolence. Benevolence is the characteristic element of humanity, and the great exercise of it is in loving relatives (ren zhe ren ye, qin qin wei da). Righteousness is the accordance of actions with what is right, and the great exercise of it is in honoring the worthy. The degree of the love decreases in accord with the distance ranging from the close to the remote relatives, and the intensity of the honor reduces in accord with the discrepancy ranging from the more worthy to the less worthy. It is for this reason that the principles of propriety are produced.(Legge, 1995:41) [①] 

Discerned in the statement, the good government is ascertained by the proper men in administration. The proper men are required to be well cultivated according to the Dao or truth of morality such that they will be able to become upright and wise enough in conducting the state affairs. What underlines the Dao of morality is the virtue of benevolence. And this virtue of benevolence is “the characteristic element of humanity” that is referred to men of humaneness, benevolence, kindness, warm-heartedness or virtuous conduct. However, the basic practice of such virtue is stemmed from loving relatives in general and family members in particular. This kinship-based love or affection is natural and authentic in most cases. It is inclined to decrease when it is extended from the close relatives to the remote ones. It is also true with the intensity of honoring the worthy that is apt to reduce when it comes to the less worthy. Under such circumstances there arise the regularities of propriety, regularities that stand for the system of rites that are established deliberately as institutions, laws, moral codes, social norms and so forth. The process of such change and development demonstrates the fact that the kinship-based love is primary but not sufficient for the administration of an entire state. Hence it is practically assisted rather than substituted by applying the system of rites to all the walks of life in order to retain the social order and pursue the common good. 

In The Confucian Analects (Lun yu), the virtue of ren has been discussed more often than other virtues. When talking over it with different disciples on different occasions, Confucius would stress some key aspects of the virtue per se. For instance, Fan Chi asked about the virtue of ren, Confucius replied, “It is to love all men.” (Confucius, 1995:12.22)  Apparently, this is the most concise definition of the virtue of ren in terms of its very nature. Hereby the love is no longer confined to the relatives, but extended to all men alike. Elsewhere a similar idea is re-emphasized in Confucius’ advice given to the young fellows:

A youth should be filial when at home, and respectful to the elders when abroad. He should be prudent, honest and trustworthy. He should outflow in love to all (fan ai zhong), and makes friends with the human-hearted (er qin ren). When he has time and opportunity after the performance of these things, he should learn more about the old texts. (Confuicus, 1995:1.6)[②]

Noticeably, the proposed action to “outflow in love to all” denotes a mode of universal love rather than the kinship-constrained affection. Naturally, this mode of universal love comes into being through a progressive process, during which it is embodied in varied but inter-connected forms. For instance, it is firstly exemplified in the form of filial piety to the parents, secondly in the form of fraternal affection to the brothers, sisters, and other relatives, thirdly in the form of human-heartedness to the friends, neighbors and fellow-citizens, and eventually in the form of all-embracing considerateness to all the people across the country and the world over. Owing to this intentional extension of “loving all men”, Zhu Xi (1130-1200), a leading thinker of Neo-Confucianism in the Song Dynasty, interpreted the virtue of ren as “the truth of love and the virtue of heart-mind” (ai zhi li, xin zhi de). This interpretation signifies that the virtue of ren is taken as the virtue of all virtues due to its inclusive and complete quality. Thus the way of attaining and performing it demands an insightful cognition of human affection qua the fountainhead of all human values in one sense, and a constant cultivation of reciprocal benevolence for the sake of the big “We” instead of the small “I” in the other sense. As for Confucius’ advice to “make friends with the human-hearted”, I think it means in the context to work as an auxiliary force to accelerate and push forward the progressive process afore-described. This function goes along with the subsequent recommendation to “learn more about the old texts” that contain the food for thought and the moral teachings in historical records.

At this point one may wonders what could be the specifics of the Confucian virtue of ren in terms of humaneness, reciprocal benevolence, universal love and the like. According to Confucius, the virtue of ren serves as a thread that unifies all his moral ponderings, and chiefly consists in at least four principles including xiao, ti, zhong and shu.

Then, what do these principles actually mean? With regard to xiao and ti, they are considered to be two cardinal principles related to the virtue of ren as benevolent actions. When talking about the character of junzi as the superior man or gentleman, Youzi, a disciple of Confucius, generalized his observations as follows: “The superior man bends his attention to what is fundamental. That being established, all practical courses of human existence will emerge. Filial piety and fraternal submission are the root of all benevolent actions, aren’t they?” (Confucius, 1995:1.2)  According to Chinese customs, xiao is a principle of filial piety to parents, and ti a principle of fraternal submission to the elder brothers. They make up the root of the most cardinal virtue of ren as benevolent or humane actions because they are characteristic of loving relatives, thus leading to the growth of family affection grounded on the blood lineage or clan system.

Empirically speaking, this family affection is born naturally, and humanized culturally. It provides a solid basis for the development of love in a much broader sense of sociality. That is to say, neither the “outflow in love to all” nor “loving all men” could be possible without the family affection as its necessary foundation. As a consequence, the family affection is thus considered by Li Zehou to be most elementary in that it serves to mould a type of “affectionate root” (qing ben ti) with regard to the historical ontology of humankind and of public ethics.(Li, 1998:18-20) This “affectionate root” is to my mind functional both as a psychological organism and a moral organism. For it involves not simply feeling, emotion and sensibility, but also understanding, cognition and reasonability. Hence it ends up with “the formation of affectionateness and reasonableness” (qingli jiegou) in the Chinese mentality and ideology with a constant emphasis on the education of human affection as the keystone of the social structure.

It is noteworthy in the Confucian thought that the virtue of ren calls for a boundless pursuit of extensiveness. Notwithstanding that it begins with family-centered constraints at its initial stage, it is further exalted to a much larger scope. For example, once Confucius told Zeng Shen, one of his students, that his doctrine is “that of an all-pervading unity,” Zeng went on to assert that “the doctrine of the Master is to be true to the principles of zhong and shu.” (Confucius, 1995:4.15)  In my observation, “the doctrine of the Master” is inferred to be the doctrine of the virtue of ren as is explored and explicated by Confucius himself over 100 times in The Confucian Analects proper, not to speak of his frequent reconsideration of it in many other discourses and texts ascribed to the series of Confucianist classics. The doctrine as such is commonly acknowledged to rely on two paramount principles of zhong and shu. As regards the principle of zhong, it is often identified with the code of conduct performed by such a man “who wishes to establish himself seeks also to let others establish themselves, and who wishes to develop himself seeks also to let others develop themselves.” (Confucius, 1995:6.30)  Illuminated obviously in what the man does, the code of conduct bears a strong and thoughtful consciousness of social interaction. Taken into account the context, the principle of zhong could be seen as that of mutual thoughtfulness or considerateness owing to its tendency to nurture the win-win stance towards all beneficiaries or stockholders as is so depicted in modern terminology. 

With respect to principle of shu, Confucius asserted that it is exemplified in “What you do not want to be done to yourself, do not do it to others.” (Confucius, 1995:15.24)  Elsewhere Confucius reconfirmed the similar idea when talking with Chong Gong: “Do not do to others as you would not wish done to yourself. Have no resentment when you are at work for the state. Have no grudge against anyone when you live together with your family.” (Confucius, 1995:12.2)  Accordingly, the principle of shu turns out to be of mutual concern such that it can be perceived as a principle of altruistic reciprocity applied to social encounters. It appears more or less identical in essence to “the golden rule” prescribed in the Bible. Yet, the principle of altruistic reciprocity is deep-set in the pragmatic reasoning of Confucianism that is chiefly characterized by ethicalness, usefulness and performativeness. It is to be exercised in daily life in the secular world. In contrast, “the golden rule” is attributed to the Christian outlook and advocated in a sacred direction. It tends to be adopted as a kind of imperative by the religious believers in that it is spiritual rather than practical, difficult rather than easy, with regard to its operation in the secular life among the general populace.

Noticeably, Confucius hereby expanded the application of the principle of shu as altruistic reciprocity to the service for the state and to the life in the family. Renowned in the Chinese tradition, the state and the family are closely interrelated and equally important. As a matter of fact, one of the leading ideals in Confucianism is to “regulate the family and govern the state rightly” (qi jia zhi guo). (Legge, 1995:1)  It is worth pointing out that the family in the past used to be so large as the size of the clan, for it would be made up of three to five generations and therefore form a network of complicated inter-relationships. It is by no means easy to regulate the family well and keep all members in stable affinity or close kinship. In reality, the state is somewhat a big community that comprises families as its basic units of social organization and administration. In the Confucian belief, if each family is well regulated, the state is most likely to be rightly governed, and then people will be liable to live a happy and peaceful life. Such a life could be impossible whenever the family and the state are plunged into chaos and conflict. Nevertheless, according to the Confucian standpoint, the whole enterprise of regulating the family and governing the state rightly depends largely upon the foundation of personal cultivation (xiu shen) in affective, moral, legal and social scopes, because both the family and the state are human products in essence and dependent upon human action in the main.

At this point, there arises a question like this: “What does the Confucian virtue of ren for eventually?” This is ostensibly a teleological query that requires a teleological judgment. Thus judging from Confucius’ preoccupation with the ideal of “regulating the family and governing the state rightly” (qi jia zhi guo) and his constant emphasis on “the supreme importance of harmony (hé wei gui) as the excellent quality,” (Confucius, 1995:1.12)  I would conclude that the Confucian virtue of ren as reciprocal benevolence and humaneness is motivated and championed to harmonize human relationships in one sense, and to facilitate social order, stability and harmony in the other. This finality is often described in terms of “keeping the state in peace and the people at ease” (guo tai min an). In order to achieve this ultimate goal, the Confucian virtue of ren works in a threefold mode comprising three inter-linked principles: the principle of family affection (qin qing) based on filial piety and fraternal reverence (xiao ti), that of mutual thoughtfulness (zhong) directed to the win-win strategy of social interaction, and that of reciprocal benevolence (shu) somewhat parallel to “the golden rule” but exercised in the daily life in the secular world.

THE VIRTUE OF REN AS THE SOURCE OF SOCIAL COMPASSION

As is exposed in the fore-going section, the virtue of ren is comprehensive in its composition and function. On several other occasions, Confucius himself treated the virtue of ren as the most fundamental and complete. For instance, he treasured the culture and power of both rites and music (li yue) to the extent that he believed firmly a state could be governed well and kept in order with the appropriate employment of rites and music. However, he denounced the practice of rites and music without the virtue of ren. Just as he decried, “If a man be without the virtue of ren, what has he to do with the rites of propriety? If a man be without the virtue of ren, what has he to do with music?” (Confucius, 1995:3.3)  All this shows that the exercise of rites and music needs a moral foundation in the virtue of ren. For the virtue as such is not merely most cardinal and determinate, but also sincere and inevitable. Going without it, the exercise of rites and music could be less effective but more pretentious, if not useless at all. 

Furthermore, Confucius often compared the virtue of ren with other virtues, and considered it to be a high standard as though it was the most complete of all. For example, when Fan Chi asked him how to attain the virtue of ren, Confucius recommended,

It is to have a sedate attitude and conduct (gong) in daily life, to remain serious and attentive (jing) when coping with affairs on duty, and be strictly sincere and honest (zhong) when helping others. Although a man happens to go among rude and uncultivated tribes, these qualities are not to be neglected. (Confucius, 1995:13.19)

Soon after this advice, Confucius continued to add, “The firm (gang), the enduring (yi), the simple (mu), and the modest (ne) are near to the virtue of ren.” (Confucius, 1995:13.27)  As noted from the above depictions, the approach to the virtue of ren involves the application of three moral codes to daily life and social services, codes that include having a sedate attitude and conduct (gong), serious and attentive work ethic (jing), and sincere and honest performance (zhong). It follows that the attainment of the virtue of ren is preconditioned with the nourishment and exercise of such virtues as the firm (gang), the enduing (yi), the simple (mu) and the modest (ne). All this seems to me that Confucius set up the virtue of ren as the most perfect one. It is so deployed as an ideal measurement of all other virtues. If this being true, it suggests a process of persistent pursuit and continuous cultivation on the part of human beings.

Then what are the key virtues Confucius is mainly concerned with? There is no easy answer to this query because Confucius offered a diversity of virtues and emphasized them on diverse occasions in accord with the interlocutors involved. In spite of this, I find three of the virtues outstanding on his agenda. They are the virtue of ren, that of zhi and that of yong as are stressed in his account:

The way of the superior man is threefold, but I am not equal to it. With the virtue of ren as humaneness, he is free from anxieties. With the virtue of zhi as wisdom, he is free from perplexities. With the virtue of yong as courage, he is free from fear. (Confucius, 1995:14.28)

As is observed in the above quotation, Confucius remained modest as usual regarding his moral cultivation and progression. He had the tendency to make the most of every opportunity for his better improvement while representing his advices or teachings to others. Here again he did not hesitate to confess that he fell short of “the way of the superior man”, the way that is threefold in terms of three cardinal virtues including ren as humaneness, zhi as wisdom and yong as courage. More specifically, the virtue of ren as humaneness keeps the man free from anxieties about the external fame, gain, honor and disgrace, because he goes beyond such desires and wants. The virtue of zhi as wisdom keeps the man free from perplexities about the phenomenal appearances and illusions, because he knows the truth and reality. The virtue of yong as courage keeps the man free from fear for difficulties, hardships and any challenges, because he is ready to confront with them even at the sacrifice of his life.

In addition, there are two more points to be referred to in this case. First, the superior man is supposed to be free from anxieties due to his possession of the virtue of ren. This could be true with respect to his selfish concerns and egoist expectations relating to external fame and gains, among others. Yet, when it comes to his social cares and concerns about the status quo of the country and the living conditions of the populace as a whole, the superior man could be filled with anxieties and even worries beyond his personal interest. His state of mind as such could be designated being disinterested as he thinks of others before himself. Secondly, the virtue of ren as humaneness cannot become what it can be without the prerequisite of the virtue of zhi as wisdom that bears the knowledge of the essential qualities of the virtue of ren. This is justified with reference to Zhu Xi’s interpretation cited in the preceding passage. Moreover, the virtue of ren accommodates the virtue of yong as courage because of its inclusive nature. This is to be affirmed by Confucius in his saying, “The man of humaneness is sure to have courage, but the man who has courage may not always be the man of humaneness.” (Confucius, 1995:14.4)

One may wonder how courageous the man of humaneness could become? According to Confucius, “The determined scholar and the man of humaneness will not seek to live at the expense of injuring their virtue of humaneness. They will even sacrifice their lives to preserve their virtue of humaneness.” (Confucius, 1995:15.9) This manifests and expects the man of humaneness to be so courageous as to lay down his life in order to accomplish his virtue of humaneness. He is too resolute and dignified to be bought over or bended by either external temptations or fatal threats. All this is due to at least two major reasons: firstly, he holds the conviction that the brave exercise of “the virtue brings glory to him, and the opposite of it brings disgrace.” (Mencius, 1995:3.4) And secondly, he cherishes the spirit of martyrdom and acts upon the virtue of ren as a moral imperative. It is in this aspect that the virtue of ren is in a way like moral dedication of a religious kind, even though it is pointed to the moral ideals and the secular goods.

It widely recognized that Mencius (372?-289 BC) succeeded Confucius as a champion to proceed with the line of thought as regards the virtue of ren as the most fundamental and perfect of all. He therefore tendered much heed to human affection and moral conduct, and moved on to reflect upon the virtue of ren together with other virtues through a psychological investigation into human nature and heart-mind. The most influential of his formulations reads,

From the feelings proper to it, it is constituted for the practice of what is good. This is what I mean in saying that human nature is good. If men do what is not good, the blame cannot be imputed to their natural powers. The feeling of compassion [commiseration] belongs to all men; so does that of shame and dislike; and that of reverence and respect; and that of approving and disapproving. The feeling of compassion implies the virtue of ren as benevolence; that of shame and dislike, the virtue of yi as righteousness; that of reverence and respect, the principle of li as propriety; and that of approving and disapproving, the virtue of zhi as wisdom [knowledge]. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, are not infused into us from without. We are certainly furnished with them. It is simply from want of reflection. Hence it is said: “Seek and you will find them. Neglect and you will lose them.” (Mencius, 1995:11.6)

According to Mencius, human beings have feelings. Feelings motivate them to take actions. Human nature is good, and so is human heart-mind. This being the case, human beings will have proper feelings, and accordingly take proper actions for the practice of what is good. It is through self-cultivation that feelings can change into virtues. For instance, the feeling of compassion turns into the virtue of ren as benevolence, the feeling of shame and dislike into the virtue of yi as righteousness, the feeling of reverence and respect into the virtue of li as propriety, and the feeling of approving and disapproving into the virtue of zhi as wisdom. These four kinds of feeling correspond to the four kinds of virtue that is determined by the judgment or knowledge of what is good, just and right. Elsewhere Mencius reasserted that the feeling of compassion is essential to men because it is the beginning of ren as benevolence, the feeling of shame and dislike is essential to men because it is the beginning of yi as righteousness, the feeling of modesty and complaisance is essential to men because it is the beginning of li as propriety, and the feeling of approving and disapproving is essential to men because it is the beginning of zhi as wisdom or knowledge. Men have these four kinds of feeling just as they have their four limbs. Those who have none of them are simply not entitled as being human. With particular reference to the feeling of compassion, Mencius illustrated the way of its presence and reaction by such an example: If men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling or alarm or distress. They will feel so, not as a ground on which they may gain the favor of the child’s parents, nor as a ground on which they may seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor from a dislike to the reputation of having been unseen by such a thing. (Mencius, 1995:3.6) All this exemplifies the moral instinctiveness, disinterestedness, and unselfishness of the feeling of compassion or commiseration. As such a feeling is aroused by the scene of such an unexpected accident and directed to another person unknown, it can be construed as socially interactive and universally applicable because it is observable in the reactions of all humans alike on the similar occasion. In a word, the feeling of compassion is essentially social rather than private. Moreover, it is not only characteristic of sympathy and pity in a passive sense, but also of warm-heartedness and performativeness in an active sense, thus engaging in spontaneous actions to help others in need no matter whether they are known or unknown. It is acted out in accord with one’s good conscience or virtuous benevolence when it is applied to the innocent victims of grave accidents, fatal diseases, natural calamities, wars, famine and the like.

As is detected in the argument, Mencius, like his predecessor Confucius, followed suit and reconfirmed the emotive and affectionate ground of the four virtues concerned. Yet, as it seems to me, he skipped over the intermediate transition from the emotive beginning to the virtuous outcome as though he took it for granted. For Confucius had already pointed it out when articulating the way of becoming virtuous in terms of reciprocal benevolence and loving all men. As is noted in his saying,

To subdue one’s self and return to the rites is the virtue of ren. If a man for one day subdue himself and return to the rites, all under the sky will ascribe the virtue of ren to him. Hence the practice of the virtue is from a man himself instead of from other, isn’t it? (Confucius, 1995:12.1)

Here are a couple of points to make in view of contextual reflection. Firstly, “to subdue one’s self” is meant to curb one’s desires, feelings, ambitions or selfish expectations. It is not parallel to the religious self-denial in that it is intended to control and discipline what is involved in egoism. It is in a way like the Greek aretē sōphrosunē, virtue of temperament or self-control.

Secondly, “to return to the rites” is meant to restore the rites adopted in the three ancient dynasties of the Xia, Shang and Zhou, rites that were deployed as the ceremonies of propriety, codes of conduct, social norms, and political institutions. Noticeably in this regard, what Confucius and Socrates sought was more or less similar, that is, what is right and good. However, Confucius appeared to be certain about it and assured its presence in the conventional rites aforementioned. He therefore advised people to decide on their right path by means of appropriate ethical choice and social commitment from the standpoint of reciprocal benevolence and universal love. In contrast, Socrates seemed to be skeptical about it and hankered after it through his dialectic reason. He did not ignore the practical values and popular definitions of the conventional virtues, but questioned them critically from epistemological positions. For he was firmly convinced that real knowledge would necessarily lead to goodness and justice. In addition, Confucius and Mencius alike expounded the development of the virtues in the living or secular world alone, whereas Socrates and Plato alike pursued it in the secular world overshadowed by the divine world. For example, the two Chinese thinkers associated it with the self-cultivation of a fine personality in the type of the superior or noble man (junzi), while their Greek counterparts linked it with the suitable utility of the divine reason as a special gift given by god to humankind. Eventually, Confucianism is preoccupied with the highest form of achievement of which man as man is capable in the visible or material world. Platonism is concerned with the becoming divine of the human in terms of that to become man as man is to become god-like in both the visible world and the invisible one. (Plato, 1994:499c-500d; 1926: 792d, 897b, 902b)  Accordingly in both moral cultivation and social interaction, Confucianism makes no distinction between mind and body, and thus sticks to monism, whereas Platonism distinguishes mind from body, and thus clings to dualism. According to Herbert Fingarette and A.C. Graham as well, one of the advantages of studying Confucius in particular is to get off the routinized contrast between mind and body as inner and outer compartments of oneself. This is simply due to the fact that Confucius would like to think of the contrast in unity by treating mind and body as an inseparable whole. Hence it can help us escape being “blinded a mind-matter dualism or by the dualistic way of dividing the world, along with the denial of the reality of the ‘mental’ half.” (Fingarette, 1978:512; Graham, 1989:26-27)

Thirdly, the intermediate transition from the prerequisite of subduing one’s self to the attainment of the virtue implies a process of self-cultivation via the revival of the rites and the conduct of propriety. This process calls for correct education and guidance in principle. In this domain, Confucius and Plato seem to share something in common to the extent that both of them were in favor of educational determinism. They held the belief that men could become virtuous or good so long as they were brought to correct education or orthen paideia. Notwithstanding this, the two thinkers appear to differ widely in their conception of human nature. Confucius was in fact optimistic about human nature, and considered it to be born good. Plato was pessimistic about it, and therefore examined it with focus on its akrasia and other weaknesses related to the passions and desires of the tripartite psychē or soul. When it comes to the process of self-cultivation, the Confucian line of thought also diverged from its Platonic counterpart. That is, the former assumes that it commences with natural desires and feelings alike, develops into affection or love through human culture in terms of rites, merges with reasonableness through modification and adjustment in accord with human relationships, and turns into the virtue of ren with the help of moral awareness and social commitment. As a result, the Confucian virtue of ren as the most paramount of all virtues features an affectionate-cum-reasonable structure because it is rooted in the family-based affectionateness and kinship love, and upgraded to the society-oriented reasonableness in terms of reciprocal benevolence and universal love. Then, Plato holds that the process of self-cultivation depends on the orthen paideia during which the divine reason and moral training should be fully applied to supervising the passionate and appetite parts of the soul. With respect to the Platonic moral psychology, it should work at its best according to the model of psychic harmony that focuses on the rational incorporation of the other components within the soul. If this does not suffice to do the job, it ought to resort to legal codes or nomoi for the sake of reinforcing the educational project and character formation. Thus the Platonic virtue of dikaiosunē as justice that is comprehensive of all virtues features a rational-cum-legal structure. The structure as such is grounded on the leadership, of practical reason over passions and desires as other constitutes of the soul, and at the same time, consolidated by persuasion and guidance of legal education. Eventually the Platonic virtue is to be sublimated to the level of divine refinement or god-likeness through learning philosophy sanely and insightfully.

An important point to be noted is that a kind of measurement is needed to look after “the emotive affection” in Confucianism and “the appetitive desires as well as the spirited passions” in Platonism. It is rather a big coincidence that the measurement is stemmed from the similar principle of “the golden mean” in terms of “Never too much, never too less”. The principle is renowned as zhongyong in Chinese and as mesos in Greek. As luck would have it, it has been all along underlying the way of thinking and the code of conduct respectively among the Chinese and Greek peoples.  

      TRANSFORMATIONAL CREATION OF THE VIRTUE OF REN

Taken in sum, the Confucian virtue of ren could be seen as that of reciprocal benevolence, universal love and humaneness in general. It is by nature most fundamental and comprehensive of other virtues. With reference to the moralized sense and translation of ren into “perfect virtue” by Legge, it is worth quoting the comment by Benjamin I. Schwartz,

Here, one would see something of a parallel to the evolution of virtus and virtue from the Latin vir. What it seems to encompass in Confucius is something as broad and even as ultimately mysterious as Socrates’ idea of the good as applied to the moral life of the individual. It is an attainment of human excellence which—where it exists—is a whole embracing all the separate virtues. Thus it certainly also embraces all the social virtues and the capacity to perform the li [rites] in the proper spirit. It is this social aspect which has led to the translation of the term as love, benevolence, and humanity. It must nevertheless be acknowledged that in much later Chinese thought it is this side of jen [ren]—its capacity to make the individual act well in all the encounters of social life—which is emphasized. (Schwartz, 1985:75-76)

This reminds me of Fingarette’s observation on the virtue of ren. I think he is right to conceive the virtue as “a directed force operating in actions in pubic space and time.” (Fingarette, 1972:55)  For an intended philopraxis of the virtue of ren in particular and of other virtues in general can be discovered in The Confucian Analects in its entirety. It leads Fingarette to come to regard Confucius as a guide to a moral philosophy with stress on its performative function of language and its interdependence with social convention. (Fingarette, 1972:vii; Graham, 1989:23)  Yet, what he says is just part of the story. Hereby I would like to add that this virtue is also a self-conscious force and operating in private space and time within the family proper. Moreover, it is to be cultivated inward and performed outward on both private and public occasions.

Above all, I think the virtue of ren is proposed in Confucianism as an ideal of human perfection, an ideal that is to be approached and accomplished via a boundless pursuit and consistent practice. According to Qian Mu, for instance, to read The Confucian Analects is to become human (zuo ren). (Li, 1998:9)  In his opinion, as far as I could see, “to become human” is to achieve the highest form of being a man as man. This highest form indicates a process of human perfection according to the constant exercise of the virtue of ren. An evidence is embodied in Confucius’ appreciation of Yan Hui’s behavior as he claimed that “Such was Hui whose heart for three months at a time would not go off course from the virtue of ren. The others might attain to this virtue no longer than a day or a month.” (Confucius, 1995:6.7) Hui’s successive praxis of the virtue “for three months at a time” connotes a long span of time in one sense, and demonstrates a spiritual and behavioral habituation in the other sense, a habituation that enables him to act upon the virtue habitually and spontaneously. In striking contrast, others could conduct according to the virtue for a day, a month or a moment. For it is not difficult for a person to do a right thing once upon a time, but it is difficult for him or her to do right things continuously for a long time, not to speak about doing them all the time. I guess we can draw a tentative inference from the description. Say, the habituation in this context bears a strong moral consciousness parallel in a way to both Aristotle’s conception of habituation and Hegel’s.

Then, what relevance can be in the Confucian virtue of ren nowadays? I suppose it lies in the rediscovery of the virtue against the problematic living condition we confront with today, the condition under which the human relationships are increasingly getting diluted or becoming thinner due to keen competition, annoying anxiety, constant distress, tense ambiance, and self-defensive mentality, among others. Therefore each of modern humans needs to use, as it were, a mirror to look at his image inside it, and meanwhile to reflect the images of others for a double check. This mirror is to be contrived metaphorically from the virtue of ren as is examined through this discussion. It can be acquired by means of sincere self-cultivation in the spirit of consistency and perseverance. However, it is, to my mind, presumed to undergo the process of creative transformation with reference to the modern society and its issues. This process can be facilitated by means of both trans-historical reconsideration of what is right or good in more than one cultural heritage during different phases of human evolution and transcultural synthesis of rule by virtue with rule by law, among all the positive and healthy value systems that we humans happen to create and share.

With respect to the diluted human relationships, for instance, the principle of shu as part of the virtue of ren is more than relevant and helpful owing to its trait of altruistic reciprocity. For it is not simply related to the cultivation of a fine personality, but also can be taken as a traditional source out of which a form of social ethics can be developed for the modern society. That is to say, individual humans can do their utmost to integrate the principle of altruistic reciprocity as part of social ethics with that of social contract, thus creating a social environment where they can enjoy living a life of equality, independence, mutual care, reverence and complaisance. If this integration is successful, it can be at its best transformed into a kind of social awareness highly needed to renovate and ameliorate the human condition. However, it can be done by resorting to either social ethics or social contract alone. It demands a complementary force to be drawn from the two scopes. For we should have something more than legal prescription to supervise any effective implementation of social contract in its instrumental sense, and also have something more than minimum morality to ensure a healthy development of human relationships in its teleological sense.

                                  Keping Wang (Wang Keping)

                                  Professor of Philosophy

                              Beijing International Studies University

                            Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Confucius, The Confucian Analects (Lun yu, trans. James Legge, Changsha: Hunan Press, 1995.

Fingarette, Herbert, “Response to Professor Rosemont,” in Philosophy East and West, vol.28, no.4 (1978).

------ Confucius: The Secular as Sacred, New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

Graham, A. C., Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, Illinois: Open Court, 1989.

Honderich, Ted (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Legge, James (trans.), The Great Learning (Da xue, Changsha: Hunan Press, 1995.

Li, Zehou, Lunyu jin du (A Present-day Reading of The Confucian Analects), Hefei: Anhui Education Press, 1998.

Mencius, The Works of Mencius (Meng zi), trans. James Legge, Changsha: Hunan Press, 1995.

Plato, Republic, trans. Paul Shorey, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994.

------ Laws, trans. R. G. Bury, London: William Heinemann, 1926.

Schwartz, Benjamin I., The World of Thought in Ancient China,Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985.