To govern is to correct. If you set up an example by being correct, who would dare to remain incorrect? [1] (Confucius)

Running parallel to the process of globalization is that of glocalization. Here by glocalization is meant the dynamic interaction between globalization and localization. This of course involves a kind of transcultural transformation not just in economy, but also in politics. As is observed in the present-day arena of Chinese political culture, glocalizational considerations are reflected in the exploration of renzheng as humane governance that is somewhat corresponding to shanzhi as good governance. Both forms of governance seem to share such similar principles as accountability, efficiency, equity, honesty, rule of law and transparency, etc. However, humane governance places more emphasis on humanity, fairness, competence, and morality with its ultimate goal to build up a harmonious society in general. It is therefore assumed, in my opinion, to consist in two most important dimensions in the Chinese context at the current stage. One is fazhi as rule of law drawn from the Western democracy and xianming as wise leadership originated from the Chinese Confucianism. It is synthetic in principle, partly traditional in the Chinese sense, and partly modern in the Western sense. This chapter attempts to look into such a synthetic creation from the perspective of Chinese pragmatic reason (shiyong lixing). Although its key argument is by and large set in the Chinese context of glocalization, it leaves open the reconsideration of it in the similar case of any other countries dwelling in the so-called “global village”.

Rule of Law as the Fundamental Basis

With the economic reform increasingly deepened, Chinese society is becoming more and more open to the outside world, and the public consciousness of humane governance is growing stronger than ever before. As a result, the old fashioned governance in the light of renzhi as rule by man encounters many unprecedented criticisms, and its practical space is shrinking day after day. The kinds of pressure that come from the problematic bureaucracy and institutional corruption all work to facilitate the emerging polity of fazhi as rule of law that is a highly recommended solution to many issues concerned. The summer of 1999 witnessed the legislation of fazhi as rule of law whose supreme status has got formally asserted in the Renewed Constitution. Ever since then it has been taken as the fundamental basis of constructing humane governance in the general sense of this term.

However, the Chinese notion of fazhi seems to be somewhat confusing, if not misleading. It is confusing to the extent that fazhi can mean rule of law or rule by law. Taken fazhi as rule of law, it focuses more on the general principle to harness and operate the public power in its most effective and reasonable manner. In this case law as such is often treated as a kind of social faith in a spiritual sense apart from its legal functions. Thus in a nation-state under rule of law, the citizens from all walks of life are kept under the supervision and protection by law in its broad sense, and the officials at all levels are monitored and restrained by law in its narrow sense. According to Thomas Hobbes and other political philosophers, the ideal of the rule of law is that governance should be conducted by means of general public rules, made in advance, and administered through regular and impartial institutions. It aims to avoid arbitrary or excessive government that acts upon the whims or momentary wishes of the powerful, and to prevent individuals from being arbitrarily singled out for either good or bad treatment. Moreover, it expects government officials to live under the same rules as everybody else because all people are naturally equals before law; and meanwhile it provides necessary means or measures to ensure personal security and property security apart from human rights and other relevant aspects ascribed to any civil society. In short, fazhi as rule of law is, to my mind, designed to perform the key function of zhiquan, meaning to ensure and supervise a justified use of public power by the officials and the government alike with a particular reference to the present-day situation in China.

In striking contrast to the rule of law, the rule by law moves onto another direction, aiming to control the populace and secure a social order by nature. Law in this regard is to be employed as a kind of social instrument in a pragmatic sense. Thus self-evidently it is embodied not only in such catchphrases as “yifa zhiguo” (rule the state by law), “yifa zhisheng” (rule the province by law), “yifa zhixian” (rule the county by law) and “yifa zhizhen” (rule the town by law), but also in the practical mode of ruling the multitudes as a whole. Hence fazhi as rule by law is deployed to serve the purpose of zhimin, meaning to govern and check the ordinary citizens rather than high-ranking officials.

Even though almost all the Chinese citizens embrace the rule of law, some of them are not very clear about the subtle distinction between the two forms of fazhi (rule of law and rule by law) aforementioned. This causes ideological confusion and ambiguous exhortation as well. For example, those who are hankering after more effective measures to nurture social justice and contain institutional corruption tend to exhort the top leaders of the central government to reinforce fazhi to its fullest degree; for they are strongly convinced that only by so doing can social justice be actualized and institutional corruption reduced. As far as we can see, what they hope for could result in at least three probabilities:

1) They advise the government, the leadership or the authorities to be law-abiding themselves so as to set up examples for their subordinates to follow, hoping the entire bureaucratic system to become lawful, controllable and working along the legal track.

2) They encourage the leadership to conduct state affairs and make sound policies according to the legal procedures as are scheduled in the national constitution. This is in their opinion the one and only alternative to avoiding the authoritarian way of policy- or decision-making out of personal likes and dislikes in case of political crises or social problems.

3) When they expect the top leadership to exercise their powers in the name of fazhi, they seem, consciously or unconsciously, to entrust a special right to the leadership or government. This will then end up in the identification of rule of law with rule by law under government administration that is given full power to act.

Under such circumstances, they seemingly expect the leadership, the government or the authorities to comply with the law, but actually ascribe to them a special type of privilege to hold up and even ride above the law. In other words, the law-practitioner tends to be mixed up with the law-giver, and fazhi will slant towards rule by law rather than rule of law. Eventually the beaten track of renzhi as rule by man will turn back, and social justice will slip into empty promise. By the same token, the law may be challenged or interfered by either power-conscious or interest-ridden drives, and even be shaped under certain conditions into a sheer instrument in the hands of the authorities for their own sake. Accordingly, the executive body may sometimes “turn from guest into host” (fan ke wei zhu), thus placing its administrative power over the law itself, and meanwhile claiming more privileges in their favor. All this being true, it would be formidable either to accomplish a democratic system par excellence or to form a civil society at all.

Undoubtedly the majority of Chinese citizens share a consensus on a successful practice and enforcement of fazhi as rule of law. But this is by no means an easy enterprise because it requires a process of continuing development both in an institutional and a cultural sense. Nowadays there are diverse forms of rule of law conducted in such developed nations as Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Japan and the United States, etc. Yet, China as a developing country cannot afford to pick up one of them and duplicate it once for all. It in fact calls for cautious observation, in-depth understanding, and transformational creation in respect to the Chinese social setting and cultural climate. For it is common sense that any proper growth of a plant could not be possible without a fine seed in fitting soil. It is for this reason that fazhi as rule of law in China needs to explore its own way in its own context with a relevant reference to the existent forms of rule of law across the world.      

At the current stage when we are talking about fazhi as rule of law with Chinese characteristics and its experimentation in Chinese social reality, there are at least three kinds of consciousness that demand a further consideration. First and foremost, it is the consciousness that everyone is born equal or has a right of equality before the law. This involves a consistent combat against the conventional ideology of keeping the powerful over the law itself. Secondly, it is the consciousness that the position of law is above all. This involves a consistent resistance against the corrupted bureaucratism and local protectionism; for they tend to claim more right and power, thus nurturing a group of “privileged people outside the law” who could become lawless in certain cases. Thirdly, it is the consciousness that the judicature should be qualified in law-enforcement, and adept in law-abiding. Ideally, they should become not merely good law-practitioners or law-enforcers, but also good law-abiders. Otherwise, the distinction between rule of law and rule by law could be nothing but empty rhetoric. Finally and also most importantly, it is the consciousness that the rule of law goes hand in hand with the due process of law, and this would be impossible without creating independent courts of law and politically independent judges capable of checking and limiting the arbitrary or excessive power of political officials. This aspect could be more crucial but difficult to be made a reality within a short period of time. Yet, it must be consistently pursued and gradually actualized because the development of genuine democracy is a process, just like the construction of a harmonious society or civil society.

Moreover, it must be taken into account the existing problems with the so-called democracy today. As is observed, “The new social and economic legislation has conferred ever increasing discretionary powers on those bodies and has provided only occasional and highly defective remedies in the form of a medley of tribunals of committees for appeal. In extreme instances the law has even gone so far as to give administrative agencies the power to determine ‘the general principles’ whereby what amounted to expropriation could be applied, the executive authority then refusing to tie itself down by any firm rules.” [2] This observation can be applied to some democratic states where the rule of law is declining to the extent that it issomewhat substituted by the rule of the majority vote. The latter would vote a political trouble-maker into power in a constitutional manner if the majority happened to be unwise for a time. Further on it might work under certain conditions to reinforce the discretionary powers of the administrative agencies such that the use of violence would become institutionalized. Quite naturally, all these problematic phenomena are also available in any form of authoritarian society, where of frequent occurrence are the flagrant cases of highhanded bureaucratic action, imperfectly checked domineer of the powerful over the private life and property of the ordinary citizen, and collective selfishness along with institutional corruption, etc. This being the instance, it is more than necessary and relevant to rediscover the origins and ideals of the rule of law with a particular reference to the present-day situation. These origins and ideals may as well be traced back to Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke, among others, which emphasize not merely the supremacy and end of good laws in terms of Reason, equality, freedom, justice and right of all individual citizens in the most legitimate mode, but also the political capacity and specified task of the government or leadership. [3] Yet, this is to be dealt with elsewhere since it is beyond the scope of the ongoing discussion.

Wise Leadership of Crucial Necessity

What is taken for granted in a democratic society is the conviction that “Where law ends, tyranny begins.” This conviction can be straightened up like this: Where the rule of law ends, the rule by tyranny begins. It is evinced true from time to time in the course of political history. Accordingly it is shared among an increasing number of Chinese citizens, but it is mostly taken as one side of the coin regarding the construction of humane governance in the light of institutional legislation. For in their observation and mentality, the rule of law is by all means a most necessary foundation of forming a legal structure in order to sustain the legislation of government and governance alike. However, it is not supposed to be automatically working in effect because the law itself is made and employed by humans. Moreover, law itself is made to break under unfavorable conditions or ill-natured deliberations.

Empirically speaking, what is deeply-seated in the Chinese psychology is the Confucian notion of governance: “zheng zhe, zheng ye.” [4] Here the first Chinese word “zheng” means “governance” and “government” alike; the second Chinese word “zheng” bears at least four implications, such as “correcting” or “correctness” (zheng que), “doing justice” or “being just” (gong zheng), “being upright” (zheng zhi)  and “being righteous” (zheng yi). Confucius identifies the two words not merely because they are homophonic, but also because they are cognate, thus revealing that the concept of governance is felt to be related to that of correcting or being correct apart from that of doing justice, being just, upright or righteous on the part of the government officials or leadership. For this reason, when Confucius was asked about governance, he replied, “To govern is to correct. If you set an example by being correct, who would dare to remain incorrect?” [5] That is to say, in order to govern well, one who governs must be able to do justice to what is done or to be done according to the principle of correctness. Embodied by so doing is the virtue or excellence of the governor or leader. It is in the same sense that Confucius acknowledges “the rule of virtue” (wei zheng yi de), and argues that the rule of this kind “can be compared to the pole star, which commands the homage of the multitude of stars without leaving its place.” [6] It means that he who conducts governance ought to have the virtuous merits of being righteous, just, correct and able above all. He can be likened to the pole star that not only keeps its place, but makes all the other stars turn towards it, say, he is thus qualified to hold his governing position on the one hand, and on the other, to win the support as well as respect by all the other subordinates and the populace alike. In a word, he is capable of best performance on duty. All this shows up the hidden notion of xianming as wise leadership who is claimed to be politically competent, morally good and practically correct. But it must be pointed out that in the past the polity mainly featured the rule by man based on the institutional system of varied rites and codes. The governance was then ascribed to one person or family assisted by the powerful. With a view to the present form of political administration and civil society, any single-minded strategy like xianming as wise leadership or dezhi as rule by virtue is self-evidently outdated as it can no long secure the possibility of humane governance under new conditions. It is therefore offered only as an object of critical rethinking instead of a special remedy to be swallowed without chewing or making any distinction.

With due consideration of the specific social setting of China in view of pragmatic reason, the possibility of humane governance is to my mind dependent principally upon fazhi as rule of law. However, fazhi as rule of law is not enough because it is still in the constructive process of maturity. This being the case, xianming as wise leadership can be utilized as an expedient means. It is in practice desirable because of its complementary function. Thus we feel inclined to compare humane governance to a pair of compasses: one is fazhi as rule of law that is of sustaining importance, the other is xianming as wise leadership that is of crucial necessity. Once again in Confucianism, xianming as wise leadership is leagued with the “Tao of sageliness within and kingliness without” (neisheng waiwang zhi dao). By “sageliness within” is referred to the inward cultivation and moral perfection, while by “kingliness without” to the political wisdom and governing expertise. An organic integration and cooperative utility of these two dimensions are assumed to produce a “sage-ruler” (shengwang), partly similar to Plato’s conception of “the philosopher-king” on in an  good ruler” in a realistic sense as is presented in the Politics. “The good ruler” is, for instance, the best of all men whose virtue or political capacity is so pre-eminent that the virtues or political capacity of all the rest admit of no comparison with his. “Such a one may truly be deemed a God among men.” [7] If he is in a position to form a government, he is apt to employ the persons of the similar caliber. Thus the government itself is most liable to be that of the best administered by the best. Excelling in virtue and political capacity, both rulers and subjects are fitted, and in such a manner they are able to attain the most eligible life. Necessarily the virtue of the good man or ruler is the same as the virtue of the citizen of the perfect city-state. “Clearly then in the same manner and by the same means through which a man becomes truly good,” concludes Aristotle, “he will frame a city-state [which will be truly good] whether aristocratic, or under kingly rule, and the same education and the same habits will be found to make a good man and a good statesman and king.” [8] This reveals the conventional ideal of aristocracy to Aristotle’s mind. It would violate the rule of law in principle if “the good ruler” followed his own judgment and volition instead of the law proper. So it always demands constant efforts to coordinate and hold a fair balance between the government of the best and that of the law in political exercise from antiquity to the present.

As is discerned in the current tendency of Chinese political culture, the traditional and the modern are mixed up with one another in certain aspects. Whatever is associated with Chinese characteristics will be something modern and traditional at the same time even though the proportion varies from one to another in accordance to the situational involvement. As far as the wise leadership is concerned, one is expected to have such cardinal virtues as interpersonal humaneness, moral righteousness, legal justice, political wisdom and public trustworthiness. Some of these virtues can be literally compared with those of “the magnanimous man” or “the morally good man” of practical wisdom as Aristotle claims in his Ethics and Politics. But they are by and large drawn from the Confucianism and then developed on the rule-of-law basis in the Chinese context of glocalization proper. Practically they may be transformed into moral constraints on the leadership in a hidden but persistent manner. Then the officials at different levels are in turn expected to internalize within their conscious life all the virtues aforementioned. Under ideal conditions they should be self-disciplined or self-controlled even to the extent that they self-conscientiously keep alert against any intentional abuse of power for self-interests or taking the advantage of any possible area beyond the supervision of law. In a word, they must be wholeheartedly devoted to the common good rather than anything else. All this is somewhat reflected in the public opinion.

Currently the public opinion about the leadership may not get fully and freely expressed in the mass media, but it passes from mouth to mouth among the multitude, and sweeps across the internet website with the help of millions of active netizens. Whoever takes the office in the Chinese government will stay image-conscious and engage in one’s service under a rather heavy pressure. The pressure is double-fold as it comes from the public comments on his work ethics and overall conduct on the one hand, and on the other hand, from his personal aspiration of what kind of role he is to play and secure in the historical progression. As a consequence, the active interaction between the leadership and the populace is less noticeable in mass media, but actually ubiquitous on almost all the occasions of social encounters. That is why the Chinese people from all walks of life, ranging from taxi drivers to university professors, enjoy a hobby or habit of making critical remarks on the leadership even at a time when they are chatting over tea cups or wine glasses. Correspondingly, the leader in office is often described as someone walking prudently upon the thin ice over a bottomless lake. But there are always some exceptions in certain cases where political hypocrisy and injustice in the play of double character still works and can never be eradicated once for all.     

Notwithstanding the favorable or unfavorable conditions, we find in the practical field of Chinese political culture that the possibility of humane governance could hardly fulfill itself by means of fazhi as rule of law alone. It could be further enhanced by selecting or electing xianming as wise leadership either in the Confucian or the Aristotelian sense. For the leader or ruler (in whatever rhetorical titles used nowadays) is inclined to have a big hand in the process of policy-making or governmental administration. He or she will play a crucial part that is exemplified, for example, through the Captain Allegory in the Republic. [9] For this reason the conception of xianming as wise leadership should be taken into due consideration especially at a time when the politics of national election is in operation. For it can serve as a critical measurement of reference so as to encourage the electors to think it over before casting their votes when electing or selecting new leadership. In order to do so in a reasonable manner, people need to have a clear vision of both the ideal condition and the actual situation. With regard the former, the make-up of xianming refers to the good and wise leader “who helps others understand clearly by his own clear understanding.” [10] This can be seen as a necessary form of transparency in the principal ideas about policy-making and governance philosophy, which will lead the citizen to make the choice rationally rather than passionately. Then with regard to the latter, there are always some men on the political arena who “try to help others understand by their own benighted ignorance.” [11] That is to say, they are neither politically wise nor morally good, but fond of fishing in the troubled water by taking advantage of the majority vote. For this reason every citizen ought to be careful and observant enough as they are accountable for political election that could be costly in many ways. Otherwise, they have no other choice but bear the cross.

The Pragmatic Reason in Question

The possibility of humane governance discussed foregoingly is analogized to a pair of compasses, including fazhi as rule of law that is in principle taken up from the Western democracy, and xianming as wise leadership that is by nature developed from Chinese Confucianism in addition to its resemblance of the Hellenic tradition. This pair of compasses can be enabled to draw proper circles so long as they are integrated into an organic whole by virtue of pragmatic reason and its practical wisdom.

This pragmatic reason in question is one of the primary characteristics of the Chinese mode of thought, manifesting in proportion the ethos of Chinese culture in general. It decries either speculative reason a priori or absolute reason, but emphasizes empirical reasonableness in a practical sense and historical rationality in a historicist sense. It is always in the movement of becoming as it primarily concerns with the temporal process of actual living and life of human groups or communities in particular. Moreover, this pragmatic reason is not telos in itself. Instead, it displaces itself as a kind of instrumental function for human existence per se, with more stress on the practical and effective aspects of rationality in the emotion-ridden or non-rational life or living experiences. Then what is the chief content of Chinese pragmatic reason? And what kernel qualities does it have? According to Li Zehou, Chinese pragmatic reason makes no clear distinction between knowledge and conviction, cognition and feeling, substance and phenomenon, etc. Mostly it can be thought of as “a creative principle in a dynamic or living process” [12] of historical accumulation, cultural formation and psychological sedimentation from which certain “absolute values or moral norms of objective and universal necessity could be developed.” [13] It was first formulated in early Confucianism but stays open to further development and modification along the passage of time in history. With respect to the assumption of humane governance in the given description, Chinese pragmatic reason can be exposed with a view to four most significant points as follows:

In the first place, Chinese pragmatic reason is identical to pragmatism in the aspect of taking usefulness (youyong xing) as a measurement of truth, maintaining that truth should be practically useful and effective in the real sense of this term. This down-to-earth principle is embodied in such a popular analogy, say, “A good cat, no matter whether it is black or white, is the one that catches the mouse.” This analogy denotes that the external distinction between the apparently discrepant means is not as important as the actual achievement of the final end. When it comes to the construction and exercise of humane governance, for instance, the majority of the Chinese people would hardly confine themselves to any stereotyped or conventionalized track. Instead, they would venture to propose a better alternative out of all the means available. It is in this case that they would make their choice disregarding whether it is traditional or modern, national or global, endogenous or exotic. For they pay more attention to the fulfillment of the end rather than the appearance of the means. Traditionally the final end in this regard used to be doing whatever possible to keep “the state in peace and the citizens at ease” (guotai minan), indicating the attainment of social stability, and the assurance of letting people live a well-off life.  But nowadays the final end is expanded to cover more things, namely, world peace, eco-environmental protection, and international responsibility, among many others. In order to realize all these goals, both Chinese culture and people tend to be open and receptive as they make no distinction between this and that providing they are all useful and effective for the purpose. For this reason in the main, they conceive of humane governance with a view to a pair of compasses made of fazhi as rule of law borrowed from the democratic West, and xianming as wise leadership derived from the traditional ideology. Since fazhi as rule of law is transplanted into the Chinese soil of reform and intended to be combined with the endogenous ideal of xianming as wise leadership, there arises not merely a glocalizational interaction, but also a process of transformational creation. All this produces more interesting challenges and momentums in the mean time. In contrast to pragmatism, Chinese pragmatic reason is by nature to place more stress on the transcendental aspect (instead of the physical aspect) of human existence and activity; for human existence and activity are intended not merely to adapt into or harness the living environment, but also to seek after a higher goal of self-perfection and self-realization.

Secondly, Chinese pragmatic reason features a moral sense (lunli gan). It in fact shares something common with Kant’s “practical reason” as both of them emphasizes the necessity of moral cultivation and ethical conduct, thus preoccupied with the building of fine personality and even the pursuit of human perfection through living experience. As usual, Chinese pragmatic reason expects a person to be morally cultivated to the extent that he or she behaves well both domestically and socially. In the former sense, he or she must be responsible for the family by fulfilling such requirements as being pious to the old, kind to the young, and loyal to the spouse when married. In the latter sense, he or she must be observing the public code of conduct, trustworthy to the friends, and reciprocally considerate of the neighbors. With regard to anyone who happens to be the state leader or government head, the moral requirements are prone to grow extensive and demanding. According to Confucianism, the requirements are up to five constant virtues including humaneness (ren), righteousness (yi), rites (li), wisdom (zhi), and trustworthiness (xin), in addition to five personality traits of being temperate (wen), kind (liang), courteous (gong), restrained (jian) and magnanimous (rang). These two sets of virtues aim to develop the person into not merely a xianming junzhu (a good leader of political wisdom) but also a junzi renge (a fine personality of all gentrice). When such a person is in power, he or she is able to take care of the state and the family in the most proper way. Further, whenever confronted with any conflict between the community good and the family interest, he or she is expected to be concerned more with the former than the latter, which naturally leads to the sacrifice of the family interest (xiaojia) for the sake of the community good (dajia). Nowadays the requirements of this kind are becoming more or less loose, but they are still working to overshadow the judgment of the leadership. Very often than not most of the Chinese citizens tend to mix up moral judgment and political appraisal when they are asked to comment on the merits and demerits of their government officials. Sometimes they even go so far as to play down the political achievement of the leader owing to his or her moral defects. Similarly they may also be tolerant with or ready to forgive a less capable leader just because of his or her publicly acknowledged moral character. This is therefore in need of reconsideration from the viewpoint of a justified distinction between moral conduct and political performance.

Thirdly, Chinese pragmatic reason interlinks the two primary aspects of human nature that could be termed as emotion-rationality inseparateness (qingli bufen). It almost always attempts to ensure a kind of balance between them. The balance in this case is acclaimed to do things and treat humans altogether in a fair and reasonable manner by fulfilling ultimately both the emotional and the rational needs. The emotional needs are mainly directed towards the equitable and reciprocal enhancement of human relationships, whereas the rational needs are in principle oriented to doing justice to the human activities according to the established rules and regulations. In addition, the situational factors (qingkuang yinsu) are also put into due consideration in the process of pursuing the balance aforementioned. When this interconnected rationale is applied to the praxis of humane governance, it gives rise to a hidden challenge both to the rule of law and the leadership, for the rule of law is actually a human enterprise carried out by human beings even though it should stay independent and rigid above all. No matter whether it aught to or aught not to, it in effect involves human feelings, emotions, and reactions of varied kinds during its operational process. In other words, it is by no means a cold and logical procedure. It is supposed to be equitably humanized rather than impersonally rigidized or categorically mechanized. Quite often in the Chinese social setting, the leadership is under heavy pressure to retain the balance between the emotional and the rational needs of the people concerned. In most cases, there exists a tension between the legal verdict and the emotional consideration. Sometimes the latter would trespass the former because the public opinion could be easily slanting towards sympathy for the weak and vulnerable even though they may have pushed some others into victims. All this makes the rule of law rather difficult, and plunges the leadership into a dilemma, and meanwhile it poses more challenges to the political wisdom of the leadership in general. As luck would have it, there has been a great deal of changes ever since the introduction of the rule of law by the end of last century. Yet, there is still a room for improvement in this situation.

Last but not the least, Chinese pragmatic reason is also closely associated with historical awareness (lishi yishi) apart from its certain materialistic inclinations. Hence “It focuses on the objective investigation, consideration, and calculation of things and events from a long-term, systematic perspective, and is less interested in the transient gains and losses, successes and failures of the present.” [14] All this renders Chinese pragmatic reason qualitatively different from other kinds of instrumental reason or philosophy. Moreover, the historical awareness is elevated to the level of a worldview that embraces both the past and the present, and stresses the oneness between heaven and humankind. Being peculiar of Chinese culture, the pragmatic reason helps “to fuse the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of history so that the view of history, epistemology, ethics, and dialectics are emerged, leading to the rise of a kind of historical reason imbued with emotion and feeling. (The focus on history reflects the concern with experience, and the emotional dimension reflects the concern with human relationships.)” [15] In addition, the spirit of Chinese pragmatic reason is largely derived from Confucianism, and conducive to a kind of paradigmatic character and way of thought which lastingly provides the Chinese people with a psychology that tends to avoid extremes by striking the mean in their living experiences or everyday activities. By “striking the mean” is referred to the doctrine of “Never too much nor too less” (guo you bu ji) because neither of them is up to the appropriate middle point. As a result of sticking to the mean, the Chinese people are apt to be cool-minded or clearheaded, but warmhearted, nonviolent, and less prone to fantasy as well as novelty. Thus,

they value higher insight but make light of logic; they are fond of history in order to make it serve live in the present; they aim at the preservation of harmony and stability in the existing organic system, have a high regards for human relationships, reject risk taking, and do not have a high regard for innovation….All these factors bring many strong points as well as short-comings to science, culture, ideology, patterns of conduct of the Chinese people. On the road of adapting to the modern and contemporary life of rapid change and scientific advancements, China seems to walk haltingly and with difficulty. [16]

Nevertheless, China is walking on, just like a boat against the current, steadily emerging from the historical burdens, ideological constraints, and external pressures, etc. In practice, if China succeeds in the future and proceeds to claim proportionate responsibility and contribution to the world peace and development, it will be a big gift to the humankind as whole because Chinese population occupies a fifth of the total living together in this “global village”. In order to achieve this goal, China needs to move forward step by step in one sense, and in the other sense, to renovate her administrative philosophy and political ideology with the passage of time. In this regard, the exercise of humane governance in view of the pragmatic reason in its most adequate mode will be of considerable significance and assistance due to its transcultural character and practical efficiency as it is assumed to be.

Notes

[1].    Confucius, 1983: 115, 12:17.

[2].    Hayek, 1978: 224, 16:5. With reference to Central Land Board, Practice Notes (First Series): Being Notes on Development Charges under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1949), Preface.

[3].    In the Politics, Aristotle proposes the rule of law in terms of its basic principles in contrast to the rule by man. He therefore asserts that “He who bids the law rule, may be deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule; but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is a wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of the rulers, even when they are the best of men.” (1287a) Further more, he exposes the features of five f,orms of democracy, and announces that “The law ought to be supreme over all, and the magistracies and the government should judge only of particulars.” (1292a) This suggests that any man, even the best of all, likely be corrupted by power because of desire and passion he naturally has. Even a man of virtue who is elected into power can hardly be trustworthy in all cases since he is subject to change due to situational temptations and pressures. Hence the magistracies and the government made up of men ought to administer state affairs according to law instead of anything else. As is noticed in the Leviathan (Oxford University Press, 1943, reprinted from the edition of 1651), Thomas Hobbes advocates the laws of nature in order to preserve personal life, secure justice, equity, liberty, modesty, and mercy relating to all individual citizens. As he argues, “The Lawes of Nature are Immutable and Eternall; For Injustice, Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawfull. For it can never be that Warre shall preserve life, and peace destroy it. [79] For the Lawes of Nature…of themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to caused them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like.[85] ” On the similar principle, the laws of nature are underlined by a kind of “Moral Philosophy that is nothing else but the Science of what is Good and Evill, in the conversation, and Society of man-kind.” [79] As is read in the Second Treatise (Two Treatises of Government, edited by Peter Laslett, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), John Locke points out the end of law in the most expressive terms to my mind. His statement follows: “The end of the law is, not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom. For in all the states of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law there is no freedom. For liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others; which cannot be where there is no law: and is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to do what he lists. (For who could be free when every other man’s humour might domineer over him?) But a liberty to dispose, and order as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be the subject of the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.” (section 57, p. 306) The end of law as such is closely leagued with the function of law as Locke affirms. These two dimensions of law by nature may serve to ensure social justice, fairness, equity, and co-existence in a possibly peaceful manner.

[4].    Confucius, 1983:115, 12:17. This Confucian canonic text is translated into most of the Western languages by a number of scholars. The most widely read of all the translated versions are those offered respectively by James Legge and D. C. Lau.

[5].    Ibid.

[6].    Confucius,1983: 63, 2:1.

[7].    Aristotle, 2000: 1284a.

[8].    Aristotle, 2000: 1288a-b.

[9].    Plato, 1974: 488a-e.

[10].  Mencius, 1988:198, 14:20.

[11].  Ibid.

[12].  Li Zehou, 2005: 329.

[13].  Li Zehou, 2006: 206.

[14].  Li Zehou, 2000: 49. Also see the original text of “Shitan zhongguo de zhihui” in Li Zehou, 1986: 305-306.

[15].  Ibid., p. 50.

[16].  Ibid.

（This paper was firstly presented at the XIXth Symposium on East-West Tradition and Globalization held in Ancient Olympia in August, 2008, and then presented in October, 2008, at the Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney. It is revised and included in Wang Keping, Chinese Way of Thinking, Shanghai: Brilliant Books, 2009）

（作者惠寄。录入编辑：乾乾）